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**The struggle over the question of who counts as human is THE question of the debate—the system of colonialism instituted by European powers in the 15th and 16th centuries haunts the present in the form of coloniality—an epistemological structure that privileges the Western subject as the only legitimate expression of human knowledge. The question of Latin American engagement can only be answered when we first unsettle the coloniality of knowledge and being that has demarcated the majority of the world as subhuman populations given over to death.**

**Wynter 03** (Sylvia, Professor of Romance Languages at Stanford University, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom

Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, 3.3 (2003) 257-337, MUSE)

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT **THE STRUGGLE OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass** (i.e., **Western** bourgeois) **conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and** therefore the full cognitive and behavioral **autonomy of the human** species itself/ourselves. **Because** of **this overrepresentation**, which **is** **defined** in the first part of the title **as the Coloniality of Being/ Power/Truth/Freedom,** **any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this** overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "**Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards** (Quijano 1999, 2000), 2 **and** of what Walter **Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself** (Mignolo 1999, 2000). 3 The correlated hypothesis here is that **all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change**, the sharply unequal **distribution of** the earth **resources** (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of [End Page 260] earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South 4 )—these **are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle**. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that **if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world**—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (**now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges**. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, [End Page 261] "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" [Bateson 1969] as if it were that of the human itself), then **the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation**. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich 1986]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties." The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" [Mignolo 2000]) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" [Bauman 1987]). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties' vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote). [End Page 262] The Janus face of the emergence of Mignolo's proposed "**modernity/coloniality**" complementarity is sited here. As also is the answer to the why of the fact that, as Aníbal Quijano insists in his Qué tal Raza! (2000), the "idea of race" **would come to be "the most efficient instrument of social domination invented in the last 500 years."** In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the "invention of Man": that is, by the Renaissance humanists' epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, "sinful by nature" conception/ "descriptive statement" of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated (Chorover 1979). While, if this redescription was effected by the lay world's invention of Man as the political subject of the state, in the transumed and reoccupied place of its earlier matrix identity Christian, **the performative enactment** of this new "descriptive statement" and its master **code of symbolic life and death**, as the first secular or "degodded" (if, at the time, still only partly so) mode of being human in the history of the species, **was to be effected only on the basis of what Quijano identifies as the "coloniality of power,"** Mignolo as the "colonial difference," and Winant as a huge project demarcating human differences thinkable as a "racial longue durée." **One of the major empirical effects of which would be "the rise of Europe" and its construction of the "world civilization" on the one hand, and, on the other, African enslavement, Latin American conquest, and Asian subjugation.**

**The affirmative’s economic engagement with Latin America is just one more manifestation of 500 years of coloniality—the promise of prosperity, democracy, and security is a toxic fantasy that obscures the trail of dead reaching back through time.**

**Mignolo 05,** (Walter, Duke University, “THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA”, 2005, 6/28/13|Ashwin)

The **logic of coloniality can be understood as working through four wide domains of human experience**: (1) **the economic: appropriation of land, exploitation of labor, and control of finance**; (2) ¶ **the political: control of authority**; (3) **the civic: control of gender and sexuality**; (4) **the epistemic and the subjective/personal: control ¶ of knowledge and subjectivity**. The logic of coloniality has been in ¶ place from the conquest and colonization of Mexico and Peru until ¶ and beyond the war in Iraq, despite superficial changes in the scale ¶ and agents of exploitation/control in the past five hundred years of ¶ history. **Each domain is interwoven with the others, since appropriation of land or exploitation of labor also involves the control of ¶ finance, of authority, of gender, and of knowledge and subjectivity**.8¶ The operation of the colonial matrix is invisible to distracted eyes, ¶ and even when it surfaces, **it is explained through the rhetoric of ¶ modernity that the situation can be “corrected” with “development,” “democracy,” a “strong economy,” etc. What some will see as “lies**” ¶ from the US presidential administration **are not so much lies as part ¶ of a very well-codified “rhetoric of modernity,” promising salvation ¶ for everybody in order to divert attention from the increasingly ¶ oppressive consequences of the logic of coloniality. To implement ¶ the logic of coloniality requires the celebratory rhetoric of modernity**, as the case of Iraq has illustrated from day one. **As capital and ¶ power concentrate in fewer and fewer hands and poverty increases ¶ all over the word, the logic of coloniality becomes ever more ¶ oppressive and merciless**. Since the sixteenth century, the rhetoric ¶ of modernity has relied on the vocabulary of salvation, which was ¶ accompanied by the massive appropriation of land in the New ¶ World and the massive exploitation of Indian and African slave labor, ¶ justified by a belief in the dispensability of human life – the lives ¶ of the slaves. Thus, while some Christians today, for example, beat ¶ the drum of “pro-life values,” **they reproduce a rhetoric that diverts ¶ attention from the increasing “devaluation of human life” that the ¶ thousands dead in Iraq demonstrate**. Thus, **it is not modernity that will ¶ overcome coloniality, because it is precisely modernity that needs and produces ¶ coloniality**.¶ As an illustration, let us follow the genealogy of just the first of ¶ the four domains and see how the logic of coloniality has evolved ¶ in the area of land, labor, and finance. Below I will complement the brief sketch of this first quadrant by going deeper into the fourth ¶ one (knowledge and subjectivity) to show how knowledge transformed Anáhuac and Tawantinsuyu into America and then into ¶ Latin America and, in the process, how new national and subcontinental identities were created. But, first, **think of the massive ¶ appropriation of land by the Spanish and Portuguese, the would-be ¶ landlords of the Americas** during the sixteenth century, and the same ¶ by the British, French, and Dutch in the extended Caribbean (from ¶ Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to Charleston in today’s South Carolina, ¶ and including the north of Colombia and Venezuela in addition to ¶ the Caribbean islands). The **appropriation of land went hand in hand ¶ with the exploitation of labor** (Indians and African slaves) **and the ¶ control of finance (the accumulation of capital as a consequence of ¶ the appropriation of land and the exploitation of labor). Capital ¶ concentrated in Europe, in the imperial states, and not in the colonies.** You can follow this pattern through the nineteenth century ¶ when England and France displaced Spain and Portugal as leading ¶ imperial countries. The logic of coloniality was then reproduced, ¶ and, of course, modified, in the next step of imperial expansion into ¶ Africa and Asia.¶ **You can still see the same projects today in the appropriation of ¶ areas of “natural resources”** (e.g., in the Amazon or oil-rich Iraq). ¶ Land cannot be reproduced. You can reproduce seeds and other ¶ “products” of land; but land itself is limited, which is another reason ¶ why the appropriation of land is one of the prime targets of capital ¶ accumulation today. **The “idea” of Latin America is that of a large ¶ mass of land with a wealth of natural resources and plenty of cheap ¶ labor**. That, of course, is the disguised idea. What the rhetoric of ¶ **modernity touted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Washington ¶ consensus would say is that “Latin” America is just waiting for its ¶ turn to “develop.”** You could also follow the exploitation of labor ¶ from the Americas to the Industrial Revolution to the movement ¶ of factories from the US to developing nations in order to reduce ¶ costs. **As for financial control, just compare the number and size of ¶ banks, for example, in New York, London, or Frankfurt, on the one ¶ hand, versus the ones in Bolivia, Morocco, or India, on the other**.¶ Thus, if we consider “America” from the perspective of coloniality (not modernity) and let the Indigenous perspective take center stage, another history becomes apparent. The beginning of the ¶ Zapatista “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” gives us a ¶ blueprint:¶ We **are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery**, ¶ then during the War of Independence against Spain; **then to ¶ avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism**, then to ¶ promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from ¶ our soil; later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the ¶ just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled ¶ and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like ¶ us. We have **been denied by our rulers the most elemental ¶ conditions of life, so they can use us as cannon fodder and ¶ pillage the wealth of our country**. They don’t care that we have ¶ nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over hour heads, ¶ **no land, no work, no health care, no food or education.** Nor ¶ are we able to freely and democratically elect our political ¶ representatives, **nor is there independence from foreigners, nor ¶ is there peace or justice for ourselves and our children**.9¶ The “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” precedes a long history ¶ rewritten from an Indigenous perspective (as opposed to the perspective of Mexican Creoles and Mestizos/as or French or US ¶ “experts” on Mexican and “Latin” American history). You may ¶ wonder whether the Indigenous people had a perspective because ¶ you imagine that history is history and what happened just happened, ¶ and argue that there are of course “different interpretations” but ¶ not “different perspectives.” Different interpretations presuppose a ¶ common and shared principle of knowledge and of the rules of the ¶ game, while different perspectives presuppose that the principles of ¶ knowledges and the rules of the game are geo-historically located ¶ in the structure of power of the modern colonial world. To show ¶ how this works, we need something such as “dependency theory” ¶ for the epistemological domain.10 “**Dependency theory” showed the ¶ differential of power in the economic domain insofar as it described ¶ a certain structure of differential power in the domain of the ¶ economy**. But it also proved the epistemic differential and the distribution of labor within an imperial geo-politics of knowledge in ¶ which political economy moved in one direction: from First to ¶ Third World countries and to contain Second World communism. ¶ In this sense, **dependency theory is relevant in changing the geopolitics of knowledge and in pointing toward the need for, and the ¶ possibility of, different locations of understanding and of knowledge ¶ production**.¶ The first part of the “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” is a ¶ history and a description of the current economic and social situation in Chiapas, subdivided into the “First Wind” and the “Second ¶ Wind” in emulation of sixteenth-century Spanish chronicles of the ¶ New World. Cast in terms familiar to those conversant with globalization, the first wind is the wind from above and the second that ¶ from below. The declaration, then, outlines the direction of a project ¶ to rewrite the colonial history of modernity from the perspective ¶ of coloniality (instead of writing the history of coloniality from the ¶ perspective of modernity). This framing is subject to questions and ¶ criticisms by critical and inquisitive readers. **Professional historians ¶ could argue** that there is little historical rigor in this “pamphlet” ¶ and that what **we need is serious and rigorous histories** of how ¶ things “really” happened. Again, that argument assumes that the ¶ events carry in themselves their own truth and the job of the historian is to discover them. **The problem is that “rigorous historiography**” is more often than not complicitous with modernity (since ¶ the current conceptualization and practice of historiography, as a ¶ discipline, are a modern rearticulation of a practice dating back to ¶ – again – Greek philosophy). In that respect, the argument for disciplinary rigor **turns out to be a maneuver that perpetuates the myth ¶ of modernity as something separate from coloniality**. Therefore, if ¶ you happened to be a person educated in the Calmemac in Anáhuac ¶ and were quite far away from the legacies of the Greeks, it would ¶ be your fault for not being aware what civilized history is and how ¶ important it is for you.¶ Other criticisms may stem from the fact that the division of above ¶ and below still originates in the concept of the “above.” Indeed, it ¶ was the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas who first described ¶ (but did not enact himself ) the perspective now being enacted by ¶ the Zapatistas. The most suspicious reader would add that it is SubComandante Marcos (a Mexican Mestizo who studied at the Universidad Autónoma de México) who narrates. Legitimate ¶ and interesting objections, these. However, such objections remain ¶ entangled in the web and the perspective of modernity; that is, in ¶ the expectations created by the hegemonic perspective of modernity ¶ itself. To unfold this last statement, let’s take another step and perhaps ¶ a detour and come back to **the inception of the logic of coloniality ¶ implied in the very idea of both “America” and “Latin” America**..4ever

**Inclusionary state practices are inherently violent – their plea to the state becomes fodder to expand the folds of empire, creating more exclusive lines of disposability**

**Agathangelou et al. 2008** (Anna M. Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Women's Studies at York University, Canada, M. Daniel Bassichis, and Tamara L. Spira, UC President's Postdoctoral Fellow in Cultural Studies at UC Davis, “Intimate Investments:

Homonormativity, Global Lockdown and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review Issue 100 Winter 2008, <http://www.makezine.enoughenough.org/intimateinvestments.pdf>)

To (re)consolidate itself, **empire** requires and **solicits** the **production of certain ways of being**, desiring, and knowing (while destroying others) **that are appropriately malleable for** what comes to be constituted as **the** so-called **new world order**.12 Just as the strategies of execution and criminalization are crucial to the practices of global war, including prisons, this strategy of creating and liquidating enemies is offered, quite importantly in the wake of trauma, as a solution for fear and insecurity. In other words, **as the imperial hold grows all the more tenuous, more and more violence is required to maintain its virulent mirage.13 To deal with pain, fear, and insecurity, this logic tells us, the demonization and demolition of the racially and sexually aberrant other must be performed again and again**.14 Moreover, within this imperial fantasy, this production, consumption, and murder of the other is to be performed with gusto and state-sanctioned pleasure, as a desire for witnessing executions becomes a performance of state loyalty.15 Likewise, in the case of prisons, it is the continual and powerful mobilization of discourses of “protection,” “safety,” and “victim’s rights” that elicit support for what seems to be limitless prison expansion.16 Lastly, it is our argument that **this promise project is always reliant on a series of (non)promises to those on whom the entire production is staged. Offering certain classes of subjects a tenuous invitation into the folds of empire, there are always the bodies of (non)subjects that serve as the raw material for this process,** those whose quotidian deaths become the grounding on which spectacularized murder becomes possible. Thus, while it is central to our thesis that the sexualized production of the racialized other holds together these ostensibly different moments, **this is a variegated and heterogeneous process that simultaneously creates others as monolithic and draws up and exacerbates internal divisions within different communities. There are, thus**, the **“enemy Others” and the “other Others” whose life and death do not even merit mention or attention**.17 Importantly, as we shall argue, we must locate what many have called “the homonormative turn” within this broader (heterogeneous) imperial logic: following the traumas of state-sanctioned repression of queer communities, the creation and obliteration of new outsides become the answer for ongoing pain and devastation. As exemplified in the U.S. state-supported HIV/AIDS pandemic—and the broader war on the poor, people of color, and dissidents launched in the wake of the radical social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—**we are told that only an insatiable appetite for annihilation could soothe the pains of our pasts. We would thus locate the mobilization of highly individualized narratives of bourgeois belonging and ascension within a larger promise project that offers to some the tenuous promise of mobility, freedom, and equality.**18 This strategy is picked up in a privatized, corporatized, and sanitized “gay agenda” that places, for example, gay marriage and penalty-enhancing hate crimes laws at the top of its priorities. **This** also **helps** us to **understand the ways** in which **revolutionary** and redistributive **yearnings that would challenge the foundations of the U.S. state**, capital, and racial relations **have been systematically replaced with strategies for** individualized **incorporation into the U.S. moral and politico-economic order.** It is this promise project that has been crucial in rerouting so much of queer politics and longing from “Stonewall to the suburbs.”19

**Coloniality naturalizes a non-ethics of death and generalizes the condition of damnation—ongoing genocide, enslavement, rape, ecological destruction and unending war is produced by and reproduces colonial epistmeologies.**

**Maldonado-Torres 08** [Nelson. “Against War : Views from the Underside of Modernity”¶ Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 2008. p 215-217¶ [http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191HYPERLINK "http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52"&HYPERLINK "http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52"ppg=52](http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52)]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that **what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war— which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries— into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony.** **Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery**, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. **That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people**, **and** then **non-European peoples** in general, **are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery** and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a “state of exception” in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben’s diagnosis, one must say that **the colony**— **long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination**— **served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity**, thereby revealing its darkest secrets.61 **It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism** (and¶ not only national socialisms or expressed forms of fascism) **that allow the “state of exception” to continue to define ordinary relations in this**, our so-called postmodern **world**. **Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life.** In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort.62 **In the racial/ colonial world, the “hell” of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves**, which Fanon referred to as the damnés de la terre (condemned of the earth). **The damné (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent “hell,”** and as such, **this figure serves** as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees **the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war.** **The hell of the condemned** is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather **signals the dispensability of racialized subjects,** that is, **the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them.** **The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value**. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. **The condemned**, in short, **inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their “hell” is** not simply “other people,” as Sartre would have put it— at least at one point— but rather **racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line.** **Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape**. **The modern** function of race and the **coloniality of power**, I am suggesting here, **can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism**.63 **This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects**— **for example, indigenous and black**— **as part of the enterprise of colonization.** From here one could as well refer to them as **the death ethics of war**. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; **it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape**. **Coloniality** is an order of things that **places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego**, and **the primary targets of this rape are women**. But **men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized**, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. **Racialization functions through gender and sex**, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well.64 Dussel, who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered . . . a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. “Males,” Bartolomé de las Casas writes, are reduced through “the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom”; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, “in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.”65 **The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable**. **And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized**, **which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization**. **The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women.** As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: **A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color**. As Joy James notes, “**its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male** [**and**/or **white**] **as normative in order to enforce a political [racial, economic, cultural, sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superio**r.” The warfront has always been a “feminized” and “colored” space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations. “Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent,” Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.66 **The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women’s bodies are hardly accidental**. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime.67 He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: 1) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women’s labor— including reproduction.68 My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that **through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a “normal” world**. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. **Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control**. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. **Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. “Killability” and “rapeability” are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence**. Lacking real authority, **colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority**, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no limits.69 Mythical depiction of the black man’s penis is a case in point: **the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous**. In short, **the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction**. To be sure, **any amount of “penis” in either one represents a threat**, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape—“raping”—while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape—“being raped.” **In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences**— in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families— **just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act**. Both “raping” and “being raped” are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. **Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and eroti**c, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise.70 “**Killability” and “rapeability” are part of their essence**, understood in a phenomenological way. **The “essence” of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world.** In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war.71 This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. **The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war— particularly slavery, murder, and rape— are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism**. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, **this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein** (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) **are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism**, as Fanon suggested.72

**The alternative is the DEATH OF THE AMERICAN MAN – this is an epistemological and semiotic struggle to deflate the enthno-class of Man**

**Maldonado Torres 05** [Nelson, professor at Rutgers, “Decolonization and the New Identitarian Logics after September 11,” Radical Philosophy Review 8, n. 1 (2005): 35-67]

Inspired by these Fanonian insights l have articulated elsewhere the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.67 I think that the peculiar intricacies between "estadounidense" patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea.68 **Today**, after the post- 1989 and post-September 11 patriotism **we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man**.6 **By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished.** American Man and its predecessor and still companion European Man are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or "America." **A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what 1 aim at in my critique**. "**Man," here, refers to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born**. ¶ It should be clear that **what I call for and defend here is epistemological and semiotic struggle**, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and shar­ing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity**. A subversive act is that which helps us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man,** such as referring to "Americans" in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called "New World." Popular culture in the u\_s. has picked up on many Spanish words and phrases (such as "Ay Caramba,.. "Hasta Ia vista, baby," and several others), but "" has failed to adopt the central one (perhaps because Latin@s have not insisted on it enough): "estadounidense." "**Estadounidense" is one of the most important words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It could be considered one of the most precious gifts (not an imperial but a decolonial one**) from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and s e e k s to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, reception of gifts and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. Indeed, **the reception or resistance of decolonizing gifts provides a measure of the presence of coloniality.**¶Before being a challenge, **Latin@s in this country have been colonized and ra­ cialized subjects as well as collaborators in different forms of racialization**. **Many Latin@s,** especially conservative ones, **desire the American and Americano Dream**­ **most often they desire it until they realize that it turns into a nightmare**, both for oth­ ers and for themselves. While the culturalist-nationalist response to the Americana Dream consists in taking away the possibility of dreaming this dream in Spanish, **a decolonial response rather abandons the very idea of the American or Americana Dream and offers as a gift the possibility for the Anglo-Saxon U . S . American to dream the "estadounidense" dream-a dream that does not have anything to do about speaking one language or another, but about learning from others basic ideas about how to conceive of oneself, in this case, to see oneself as a nation-in-relation rather than as a continental being.71**

**And we must decolonize debate practice itself—Education based on Western epistemologies continue forms of colonial schooling designed to reproduce coloniality- from the “moral project” of educating and civilizing the Indians to teaching of social Darwinism in the Congo. Decolonizing education requires not only an analysis of the knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, colonial history, and political economy inherent in educational activities like debate but also foregrounding the possibility of epistemic resistance.**

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Revisiting histories of colonial educational policy in schooling helps us contextualize¶ and demonstrate how evidence-based education, tied to high-stakes testing and¶ neoliberalism, reproduces past colonial ideologies with respect to developing colonized¶ labor. **Throughout European colonialism, schooling was not only used to colonize¶ the minds to force cultural assimilation or acceptance of colonial rule, but also to¶ produce a reservoir of subservient labor that would harvest and mine commodities for¶ the imperial economy.** For instance**, in North America, colonial schooling ‘introduced¶ the concept of forced labor as part of Indian education, transforming the ostensibly¶ “moral project” of civilizing Indians into a for-profit enterprise’** (Grande 2004, 13). In¶ boarding schools, **part of the most important feature of the colonialist curriculum ‘was¶ the** inculcation of the industrial or “**Protestant” work ethic’** (13). In **the Belgian¶ Congo, Darwin’s scientific racism was the dominant discourse among Belgian colonizers,¶ and it influenced their colonial educational policy.** For the Belgian government¶ and leaders of industry, **the Congolese was to learn in school a work ethos that clearly¶ catered to the economic endeavor, and to mold the Congolese playfulness and laziness¶ into a life of ‘progress,’ order and discipline** (Seghers 2004, 465). **In Hawaii, colonial¶ schools ‘became less a means of religious conversion and more a site for socializing¶ Hawaiian and immigrant children for work on the plantation’** (Kaomea 2000, 322). In¶ Africa in general, Urch notes: The demand for skilled native labor by the white settlers and commercial leaders caused¶ the colonial administrators to reevaluate the educational program of the missions.¶ **Education solely for proselytization was not considered sufficient to enable the colonies’¶ economy to expand**. **Government officials saw the need for an educational process that¶ would help to break down tribal solidarity and force the African into a money economy**.¶ (1971, 252)¶ In short, **colonial schooling played a significant role in disciplining the minds and**¶ **bodies of the colonized for imperial profit**.¶ Interestingly, when it came to ‘pillars of the curriculum,’ what was common¶ among many colonial environments, ‘were religion and the legendary “3Rs”¶ [Reading, (W)riting and “Rithmetic”]’ (Sjöström 2001, 79). These pillars of the¶ curriculum very much parallel, with a slight change, the curriculum that is tested via¶ PISA and TIMSS which concentrates on reading, math, and science. In the contemporary¶ context, science has replaced the pillar of religion in the curriculum. Also, in the¶ present context, **the neoliberal economy has replaced the old imperial economy**, **but**¶ **the objective for schooling still stays the same, which is to produce a labor force for**¶ **the global economy.** As Lipman points out, **these accountability reforms ‘certify that¶ students that graduate from’ schooling ‘will have [the] basic literacies and disciplined¶ dispositions’ needed for a global workforce** (2003, 340). **International organizations¶ such as the OECD and the World Bank, have replaced the old adage ‘protestant work¶ ethic’ of colonial schooling**, with the knowledge and skills to function in the knowledge¶ economy, such as literacy to manipulate information, problem solving, math, and¶ science (Spring 2009). In other words, like colonial schooling, **education via neoliberal¶ reform is working towards reproducing a labor force and objectification of the¶ colonized**. Ceasire’s argument of ‘thingification’ fits very well with the colonizing of¶ bodies in neoliberal educational reform. **Teachers, students, and education in general¶ are all objectified and reduced to commodities to serve the global economy**. To this¶ end, Lipman states: **Students are reduced to test scores, future slots in the labor market, prison numbers, and¶ possible cannon fodder in military conquests.** **Teachers are reduced to technicians and¶ supervisors in the education assembly line – ‘objects’ rather than ‘subjects’ of history**.¶ **This system is fundamentally about the negation of human agency**, **despite the good¶ intentions of individuals at all levels.** (2004, 179)¶ **Global colonialism continues with the evidence-based education movement,** as education¶ is increasingly reduced into standardized packages that can be sold in the global¶ marketplace, while at the same time **promoting a system of education that is focused¶ on training a skilled workforce that will operate in the global labor market (**Lipman¶ 2004; Berry 2008; Spring 2009; Rizvi and Lingard 2010). To this end, Fanon states:¶ I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled¶ with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object¶ in the midst of other objects. (1967, 109).¶ **The desires and agencies of many teachers, students, and educational leaders are being¶ stripped away,** **while at the same time they are turned into ‘an object in the midst of¶ other objects’ through the neoliberal logic of evidence-based education**. In summary,¶ **the neoliberal agenda, currently dominant in education systems around the world, reproduces**¶ **colonial educational policies**. Within the evidence-based education movement, **the epistemic and material are not separate but are intertwined in colonial discourse¶ and history**. As this section demonstrates, **evidence-based education not only colonizes¶ education epistemologically, but also perpetuates materialist power relations and¶ disciplines bodies of the colonized to serve the global economy.**¶Concluding remarks and implications¶ [**U]nless educational reform happens concurrently with analysis of the forces of colonialism,¶ it can only serve as a insufficient Band-aid over the incessant wound of imperialism**.¶ (Grande 2004, 19)¶ Grande eloquently summarizes the intention behind this article, which is to offer a¶ conceptual map linking events of the colonial past with a present movement that¶ continues to perpetuate colonial discourses and practices within educational policy.¶ My hope is that the analysis presented in this paper provides an alteration in terms on¶ what is unsaid or left out in educational policy and bolsters a critical analysis of power¶ in educational policy. I argue in this paper that the evidence-based education movement¶ is very much tied to multiple colonial discourses, which can be traced back to a¶ colonial history that has simply been ignored in the literature. In other words, this article¶ challenges us to move beyond the confines of Eurocentrism and historical amnesia¶ to critically examine evidence-based education and to contextualize this movement¶ within colonial discourses and histories. It is my hope that this article demonstrates the usefulness of the anticolonial lens¶ in examining educational policy. **This framework foregrounds the intersections¶ between knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, colonial history, and political economy, in¶ educational policy**. **The epistemic, cultural, and material perspectives in anticolonial**¶ **thought are applicable to policy analysis**. This is evident in the way that ‘educational¶ research,’ ‘evidence,’ ‘curriculum,’ and ‘learning outcomes’ are being defined and¶ re-imagined in evidence-based education, as these are ultimately shaped by material¶ relations of power that are colonizing. For instance, common to any colonial¶ discourse is the rationale for purifying administration in the name of efficiency, and a¶ binaristic civilizing narrative is used in this regard. By naming and representing¶ education as a field in chaos, **evidence-based education proponents, with good intentions,¶ are justifying actions and measures to make education systems more evidencebased¶ and in turn standardize and rationalize complex educational processes.** As this¶ paper demonstrates, **many proponents of evidence-based education profess an¶ educational policy with the intention of improving learning for all students** (which¶ may be their full intent), **but their discourse continues to perpetuate colonized power**¶ **relationships**. In other words, **they are unknowingly striving to control and ‘tame’¶ education through evidence-based education.** **An anticolonial lens also reminds us how social hierarchies and knowledge¶ systems were used to justify colonial interventions with the objective of reshaping¶ society in order to exploit the labor and material resources of the colonized**, **and allow¶ for certain power relations to be legitimized.** **In the evidence-based education movement,**¶ **we see the mobilization of colonial discourse with regard to the way ‘evidence’**¶ **and ‘learning’ is being constructed and used to purify the production of knowledge to**¶ **meet neoliberal ends of education**. Furthermore, **the anticolonial lens reveals the¶ commodification, objectification, and dehumanization of bodies and knowledge¶ systems in colonial processes**. This article demonstrates how this ‘thingification’ occurs in evidence-based education for teachers, students, and educational leaders. An¶ anticolonial lens cannot separate the political economy from the epistemic issues. To¶ this end, this paper demonstrates how **evidence-based education is part of a neoliberal**¶ **agenda which is also tied to global colonialism and the production of colonized labor**.¶ In short**, an anticolonial lens helps to bring forward the social–historical–political¶ processes that stem from colonial relations of power and informs contemporary¶ knowledge production, validation, and dissemination in educational policy.** **An anticolonial lens also stresses that colonial discourses and material relations of¶ power are not absolute, and that the colonized also have discursive and material¶ agency**. To this end, one of the limitations of my analysis is that it overlooks the¶ agency among the colonized, and has presented evidence-based education as a monolithic¶ discourse with homogenizing effects, rather than a partial discourse that is¶ contested and lived differently from its intentions. Historically, and in present¶ contexts, imperialism and colonialism were never monolithic or unidirectional, and¶ the boundaries between colonizers and colonized were not clearly demarcated (see¶ Cooper and Stoler 1997; Young 2001; Bush 2006). Similarly, evidence-based education¶ is not an absolute, unidirectional discourse. **From an anticolonial lens, we need to¶ look for those sites of resistance and discrepancies to highlight the limitations/¶ inequities of evidence-based education and bring those struggles to the foreground**. To¶ this end, I will now discuss some examples of the ‘tensions’ and resistances to¶ evidence-based education. For instance, **in Canada, the British Columbia Teacher’s¶ Federation has led a campaign to resist the Foundations Skills Assessment** instituted¶ by the provincial government (http://www.bctf.ca/fsa.aspx). In Ontario, **African-¶ Canadian parents are frustrated with** the Toronto **public schooling system failing to¶ respond to the needs of Black youth and are** **demanding Africentric schools** from the¶ Toronto District School Board (Adjei and Agyepong 2009). **In the USA**, Fine et al.¶ (2007) describe, how **schools, communities, parents, and grandparents are engaged in¶ active resistance** to such accountability measures and schooling. **Chicago residents** of¶ Little Village **have launched an organizing campaign for a local high school dedicated¶ to culture, community, and activism**, which **culminated in a 19-day hunger strike** by¶ Latino high school students, educators, community organizers, residents, and even¶ grandmothers. Similarly, in **a California community**, largely populated by migrant¶ families, the school district, joined by nine other districts and civil rights organizations,¶ **sued the state over the improper use of English-language assessments to test¶ English Language Learners** and the sanctions they face under NCLB (Fine et al.¶ 2007). Teachers also have the agency to interpret, disseminate, and act on the information¶ based on such accountability policies (Lipman 2002; Ball 2003; Sloan 2007). Some¶ teachers have left the profession as an act of resistance because these accountability¶ trends no longer reflect their critical educational philosophy (McNeil 2000; Lipman¶ 2002; Ball 2003). Other **teachers enact resistance by subverting the official test-based¶ curriculum**. For instance, as one Chicago school teacher put it:¶ I think that we are having a rough time, that sometimes we may lean a little bit more¶ towards CPS policies and other times we lean a little bit more to ‘screw CPS’ and focus¶ on critical thinking skills. (Lipman 2002, 392)¶ Some still display ambivalence towards teaching for the test for the purpose of¶ surveillance: I have mixed feelings about it … I think it’s how we interpret the results. If we use it to¶ say our school is better than yours, then I don’t want to do it. If we use it so that we can¶ help the teachers program better for the kids, then that is more useful as a tool. (Canadian¶ Grade 3 teacher, cited in Childs and Fung 2009, 9)¶ In short, **teachers, students, parents, families, and community activists have demonstrated¶ the agency to negotiate and contest these colonial discourses in every day¶ practice**. Accountability reforms, tied with evidence-based education, depending on¶ context, have also had multiple effects on schools and curricula, and also have critics¶ from within. Scholars have noted how **the colonizing effects of accountability reform¶ on schooling and resistance to these reforms depend on the context and the questions¶ of race, class, language, and localized policies** (Lipman 2002, 2003; Earl and Fullan¶ 2003; Maxcy 2006). For instance, in her study on the impact of accountability reform¶ for four Chicago schools, Lipman notes how these ‘schools’ responses to accountability¶ are closely linked to past and present race and class advantages, the relative political¶ power of their communities, and new forms of racialization’ (2003, 338).¶ Moreover, in a significant minority of cases, high-stakes testing has led to curricular¶ content expansion, the integration of knowledge, and more student-centered, cooperative¶ pedagogies, such as in secondary social studies and language arts (Au 2007).¶ Hence, the nature of high-stakes-test-induced curricular control is highly dependent¶ on the structures of the tests themselves (Au 2007). In summary, **high-stakes testing¶ does not produce a monolithic effect, but has heterogeneous results depending on¶ questions of social difference and context**. Furthermore, **proponents of evidence-based¶ education ‘are not monolithic and that at least some of them are open to dialog on the¶ issues on which we disagree’** (Maxwell 2004, 39). In short, **an acknowledgment of the¶ colonial historical legacy of the evidence-based education movement may help us¶ move beyond a discourse of sameness in colonial discourse, and start thinking about¶ the possibilities, interruptions, contestations, and resistances to the colonizing effects¶ of evidence-based education**. Recently, there has been growing ethnographic studies¶ that examine such sites of resistance and contradictions at the ground level. These¶ spaces are where future studies and dialog could focus their attention. **In terms of policy and educational practice, an anticolonial lens motivates us to ask**¶ **a different set of questions and re-imagine educational research, practice, and policy.**¶ For instance, **what is being left out in the discussion of evidence-based education¶ movement is the glaring systemic inequities that are privileging some bodies**¶ (students, teachers, and administrators) **and knowledge systems (**language, curricula,¶ and culture) **over others** (see McNeil 2000; Lipman 2004; Valuenzela 2005; Maxcy¶ 2006), **that are tied to the global economy** (Stewart-Harawira 2005). Rather than blaming¶ students, teachers, and administrators for progress in public tests, and working¶ from a deficit model, **we need to shift our attention towards deploying significant¶ material and intellectual resources to** serve diverse needs and minoritized bodies¶ (Lipman 2002, 2003), and **challenge global economic systems**. Furthermore, **instead¶ of looking for the pitfalls of educational practice, we could ask** and explore the following¶ questions (see Asa Hilliard cited in Lemons-Smith 2008; Hood and Hopson 2008):¶ How does academic excellence flourish in schools attended mostly by minoritized¶ students? **How do teachers who reject the status quo and define excellence as responding¶ to community needs, find ways to promote excellence for all students regardless¶ of their circumstances**? ‘Student achievement at what cost’ [Michael Dantley, personal communication]? What ideological paradigms underlie teacher education?¶ What is the role of teacher preparation programs in perpetuating and promoting these¶ values of equity and social justice?¶ Finally, in terms of educational policy, we may ask: **whose cultural assumptions¶ and histories inform such accountability systems, ‘evidence,’ ‘data,’ and ‘learning¶ outcomes?’ ‘Whose notions of evidence matter most?** **And to whom does evidence¶ matter most?’** (Hood and Hopson 2008, 418). According to Stanfield (1999) and¶ Gillborn (2005), **educational policy and research continue to impose the standards and**¶ **products of White supremacy on the racially minoritized.** As Stanfield states:¶ **Implicit White supremacy norms and values contribute … to Eurocentric concepts and¶ measurement epistemologies, techniques, and interpretations** … Concretely, in the¶ United States and elsewhere in the West, … **it has been considered normative to consider¶ Eurocentric notions and experiences as the baseline, as the yardstick to compare and¶ contrast the notions and experiences of people of color**. This is … most apparent in¶ designing, implementing, and interpreting standardized tests and survey instruments.¶ (1999, 421)¶ I would argue that **we need to ‘reappropriate’ evidence-based education to include a¶ broader array of evidence, experiences, and cultural knowledges** (Luke 2003, 98; see¶ also Stanfield 1999; Valuenzela, Prieto, and Hamilton 2007). Finally, borrowing the¶ words of Asa Hilliard III, **we need to ask, ‘do we have the will to educate all children’**¶ (cited in Lemons-Smith 2008, 908), **to respond to the needs, survival, self-determination,¶ and sovereignty of their respective communities and the planet?** (see also Dei 2000;¶ Grande 2004). In an era of transnational capital, where ‘[g]lobalized discourses and agendasetting¶ and policy pressures now emerge from beyond the nation’(Rizvi and Lingard¶ 2010, 14–15), we need to have transnational dialogs (Mohanty 2003) on the impact of¶ evidence-based education and neoliberal reform across borders and social institutions.¶ This is because such transnational alliances and solidarity are needed to contest global¶ forces informed by transnational corporations as well as international organizations¶ such as the World Bank and OECD. What is noteworthy and rarely discussed, are the¶ similarities and differences in the discourses and effects of evidence-based education¶ movement across the three nation-states analyzed in this paper. Future research could¶ speculate and study how these ideas of evidence-based education circulate and move¶ across borders (see Rizvi and Lingard 2010).¶ Finally, as someone who has had the privilege to teach research methodology to¶ graduate students (including teachers, teacher educators, principals, and superintendents),¶ I am alarmed by how many of my students grumble about standardized testing,¶ and some even focus their research on such topics. What is also disconcerting is how¶ many of my students have a hard time imagining research and evidence that go¶ beyond numbers because of the ‘numbers game’ they must play in their daily working¶ lives. These trends are not a reflection of my students’ inabilities to see beyond¶ numbers, but a testament to the hegemony of the structural environment that reminds¶ them of what constitutes valid knowledge every day. Also of great concern is the¶ speed at which educational leaders, students, and teachers are being rushed through¶ standardized processes that leave little time for reflection, authenticity, and healing.¶ Many of my students have shared these accounts in my classroom, with me in person,¶ and in their reflection papers. For instance, one student who is currently a high school¶ teacher commented in a recent email: ‘The standards and objectives themselves work to eliminate any third space or anticolonial space. We read, write, process for the sole¶ purpose of testing and not for liberation.’¶ In this regard, I propose that we need to ‘slow down’ in educational practice and¶ policy. To this end, I am reminded of the words of Malidoma Some, an African Shaman¶ healer, who stated ‘while that the indigenous world looks, the industrial world over¶ looks’ (emphasis added). **Educators, teachers, students, and policy-makers need time,¶ not to be given more information for decision-making or learning, but more importantly¶ to assess what we are overlooking in educating future generations.** For instance, we¶ need more time to come together, dialog, heal, build reciprocity, understand difference,¶ and re-imagine educational policy and practice for the benefit of future generations. **It¶ is only by slowing down that we will realize that our students, educational researchers,¶ teachers, and administrators are not ‘uncultivated soil,’ in the words of La Casas, but¶ rather seeds with the power within to germinate on their own if they are provided the¶ freedom, resources, and time. Slowing down is what I believe decolonizing education¶ means in this era of neoliberal policies and transnational capital!**

**Solvency**

**Uncertainty and nonlinearity are inevitable due to inherent complexity within systems**

**Ramalingam et al 8** [Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and Implications for development and humanitarian efforts" <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf> ] 10

Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that human systems do not work in a simple linear fashion. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, clear causal relations cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction between linear and nonlinearity is far from trivial. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. Linearity describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately; finally, all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, the whole is exactly equivalent to the sum of the parts. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. Nonlinearity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such relationships cannot be taken apart – they have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the dynamics of change are highly context-specific. Therefore, if there are assumptions, aggregations and theories about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are not entirely appropriate when applied to the dynamics of a new local situation, then this perspective is unlikely to lead to a deep understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the hoped-for changes. Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). It is important **from the outset** to understand the association and interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very

**linear logic, which suggests that if Activity A is done, Output B will result, leading to Outcome C and Impact D.** This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to re-frame the debate. If the two goals of accountability and learning are also about different mindsets, the degree to which an appropriate balance can be struck – without exploring these mindsets and the assumptions on which they are based – is open to question. Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: <http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm>. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. **Complexity** does **suggest** that, **in certain** kinds of **systems**, **future events cannot be forecasted** to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it **is not possible to offer any firm prediction** of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, **in other** system**s, future events can be foreseen** in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability **to predict** is concerned. **It is important to clarify** that certain **levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future.** Complexity science suggests that it is important to identify and analyse these levels of unpredictability as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, and not treat uncertainty as in some way ‘unscientific’ or embarrassing. **Rather than rejecting planning outright**, there is a need to **rethink the**purpose and **principles** of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary **to** incorporate an **acceptance** of the **inherent** levels of **uncertainty** into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006).

**Climate change is complex – there’s not a single cause/effect relationship – takes out their internal link**

**Cuomo, 2011** (Chris, Professor of Women’s Studies at UGA, Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility Hypatia 26, no. 4 Fall)

Although temperature increases are driving climate change, “global warming” is probably not the best phrase to describe the problems caused by the industrial greenhouse effect, because average warming is not experienced as a universal shift toward warmer temperatures in every location or every season. An increase inaverage global temperatures does affect weather, but not in a simple one-dimensional fashion, and its ripple effects extend far beyond the weather. **Earth’s climate is a massive multidimensional pool of elements and factors, including air and soil temperatures, water systems, aerosols, currents, clouds, plant respirations, farm-animal ﬂatulence, volcanic eruptions, human inﬂuences, solar impacts, and more**. The real danger of **global warming is** that it is **creating changes in the entire climate system, resulting in somewhat predictable effects like higher sea levels, melting glaciers, and drier deserts, but also increasing risk and uncertainty in nearly every sphere of life.** “**Climate change” or “climate chaos” therefore more accurately name the problems caused by the rampant use of fossil fuels and chem-icals**, a state of affairs that could also be described as planetary toxic overload. **Climate change** is an ethical issue of epic proportions, for it endangers every-thing on Earth that human beings depend upon and care about. It **is** also **a very difﬁcult set of practical problems, for climate change has emerged from powerful and deeply entrenched economic and social norms and practices, and it is laden with unpredictable unknowns**. It is also an urgent issue, and this urgency should shape our ideas about what ought to be done about it, and by whom. Most philosophical discussions of the ethical dimensions of climate changeemphasize the responsibilities of nations, especially the wealthy nations that cre-ated the problem, to drastically reduce greenhouse gas levels and to providefunding for poorer nations to address related impacts (Jamieson 1992; Shue1993; Jamieson 2001; Brown 2003; Gardiner 2004; Gardiner 2006; Jamieson2007). **The need for mitigation, or reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, is a global matter requiring international agreements and actions on the part of nation-states and international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank**. **But nations and international bodies are not the only relevant parties** with moral responsibilities related to climate change. **Mitigation also involves policies, practices, and decisions at other “levels”** of ethical agency, **carried out by corpo-rations, state and local governments, communities, households, and individuals**. **Climate change is a global issue that is also always local, as impacts occur and responses are implemented in speciﬁc locations.** Anyone might be inclined toprotect her own community, or the planet and its species and ecosystems, fromharm, and anyone whose practices contribute greenhouse gases to the atmo-sphere may rightfully feel a moral obligation to change her practices.

**Hegemonic polarity is an untestable abstraction with no provable relationship to the complexities of existing geopolitics**

**Bernstein et al 2000** Steven, Associate Professor of Political Science @ U of Toronto, Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government @ Dartmouth, Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and the Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs @ U of Toronto, Steven Weber, PolySci Prof @ Berkeley “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations March 6.1 43-76

In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). **The concepts of polarity, relative power and the balance of power are among the most** **widely used** independent variables**, but there are no commonly accepted** definitions or **measures for them**. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost **every** statement or **hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be `tested'** decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. **Unresolved controversies rage over** the definition and **evaluation of deterrence outcomes, and** about **the criteria for democratic governance** and their application to specific countries **at different points in their history.** Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). **The lack of consensus** about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness — although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it **has** more **to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves**. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science **theories** are for the most part **built** on 'idealizations', that is**, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena** through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) **are not descriptions of reality but implicit 'theories' about** actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). **The inevitable differences in interpretation** of these concepts **lead to different predictions** in some contexts, **and** these outcomes may eventually produce **widely varying futures** (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that **in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among** putative **causes** **make the likelihood of a** general **theory** extraordinarily **low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.**' Complexity in the form of multiple causation** and equifinality **can also make simple** statistical **comparisons misleading**. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997).

**Their depiction of China as a threat is a discursive construct that doesn’t reflect objective reality. The thesis of a threatening Chinese rise is a falsehood designed to ratify Western power.**

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 20**04**, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142

These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?”46 **Obsessed with this self-imagery**, many scholars and **policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place**.47 **With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view**. Indeed, **China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific**.”48 That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, **this ‘China threat**,’ I suggest, **is** not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily **a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy** and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.”49 In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’50 Thus, **China’s real challenge for America**, as Yu Bin notes, “**is** perhaps **more psychological and conceptual**—that is, **how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington**, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.”51 Also, it can be argued that **the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation**.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?”52 Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.”53 While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. **With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage**, Western and particularly **American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.**

**ADV 1**

**Warming inevitable even if we cut emissions to zero—multiple studies confirm**

Gillett et al 10**—**director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and AnalysisNathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. *Nature Geoscience*

**Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1\_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions. Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.**

 **[China and India make warming inevitable.]**

Richard **Duke**, Director of the NRDC’s Center for Market Innovation and Carter F. Bales, Managing Partner Emeritus of the Wicks Group of Companies, Sep/Oct, **‘8** (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, Iss. 5; pg. 78, p. Proquest)

Containing climate change will require reducing the current levels of greenhouse gas emissions not only in the United States and other wealthy countries but also in rapidly developing nations such as China. Per capita emissions in the United States today are four times as great as those in China and 20 times as great as those in India. But China has already overtaken the United States as the worlds largest overall emitter of carbon dioxide. **Even if the wealthy countries cut their** total **greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent** by midcentury, aggregate **emissions from the developing countries cannot be permitted to continue increasing** long after 2020, **or expected warming will exceed the critical threshold of two degrees Celsius**. The international community must therefore urgently implement a durable global strategy to address the climate threat.

**[Global Warming alarmists are wrong—the world is actually cooling]**

**Ferrara 5/31/12 (**Peter Ferrara, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/>**)**

Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global warming. That is because **natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling, global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years, and global temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more**.¶ That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers, talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy.¶ The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-interested political science you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the conference speeches are [online](http://climateconferences.heartland.org/iccc7/).¶ What you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious, pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the **climate alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are causing catastrophic global warming** in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do have any response.¶ The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its Climate Change Reconsidered volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC).¶ Those Climate Change Reconsidered volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their response is to Climate Change Reconsidered. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently.¶ Check out **the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming** (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles.¶ For example, **temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age**. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now.¶ In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, **a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage**. **The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures**.¶ Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).¶ In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes?¶ Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that **global temperatures would decline by 2010**. He made that prediction because **he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999**, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant.¶ Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the **global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public** debate.¶ Easterbrook shows **that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away**, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and **the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically**. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well.¶ Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects **the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades** or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend.

**5. Flawed studies - warming’s not a threat and not anthropogenic**

**Leake 10** (Jonathan, Times Online, Citing John Christy of the UA Huntsville, a former author for the IPCC, “World may not be warming, say scientists,” 2-14, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yesHYPERLINK "http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737"&HYPERLINK "http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737"randnum=1269060067737](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article7026317.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269060067737))

The United Nations climate panel faces a new challenge with **scientists casting doubt on its claim that global temperatures are rising inexorably because of human pollution.** In its last assessment the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said the evidence that the world was warming was “unequivocal”. It warned that greenhouse gases had already heated the world by 0.7C and that there could be 5C-6C more warming by 2100, with devastating impacts on humanity and wildlife. However, **new research**, including work by British scientists, **is casting doubt on such claims. Some even suggest the world may not be warming much at all. “The temperature records cannot be relied on as indicators of global change,” said** John **Christy, professor of atmospheric science at** the University of **Alabama** in Huntsville, **a former lead author on the IPCC.** The doubts of Christy and a number of other researchers focus on **the thousands of weather stations around the world**, which have been used to collect temperature data over the past 150 years. These stations, they believe, **have been seriously compromised by factors such as urbanisation, changes in land use and, in many cases, being moved from site to site.** Christy has published research papers looking at these effects in three different regions: east Africa, and the American states of California and Alabama. “The story is the same for each one,” he said. “The popular data sets show a lot of warming but the apparent temperature rise was actually caused by local factors affecting the weather stations, such as land development.” The IPCC faces similar criticisms from Ross McKitrick, professor of economics at the University of Guelph, Canada, who was invited by the panel to review its last report. The experience turned him into a strong critic and he has since published a research paper questioning its methods. “We concluded, with overwhelming statistical significance, that **the IPCC’s climate data are contaminated with surface effects from industrialisation and data quality problems. These add up to a large warming bias,”** he said. Such warnings are supported by a study of US weather stations co-written by Anthony Watts, an American meteorologist and climate change sceptic. His study, which has not been peer reviewed, is illustrated with photographs of weather stations in locations where their readings are distorted by heat-generating equipment. Some are next to air- conditioning units or are on waste treatment plants. One of the most infamous shows a weather station next to a waste incinerator. Watts has also found examples overseas, such as the weather station at Rome airport, which catches the hot exhaust fumes emitted by taxiing jets. In Britain, a weather station at Manchester airport was built when the surrounding land was mainly fields but is now surrounded by heat-generating buildings. Terry **Mills, professor of applied statistics** and econometrics **at Loughborough** University, looked at the same data as the IPCC. He **found that the warming trend it reported over the past 30 years or so was just as likely to be due to random fluctuations as to the impacts of greenhouse gases.** Mills’s findings are to be published in Climatic Change, an environmental journal. **“The earth has gone through warming spells like these at least twice before in the last 1,000 years,”** he said.

**1. Prolif will be slow**

Waltz, 00 (Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, v1 n1, Winter/Spring, <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html>)

It is now estimated that about twenty–five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it–wisely I believe–because neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy them. You have to have an adversary against whom you think you might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats–certainly not any in which a nuclear force would be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two states **per decade** gradually develop nuclear weapons.

**2. New Proliferants will have small arsenals and will conceal them – this assures stable control**

Seng 97 (Ph.D. candidate in Political Science @ the University of Chicago 97 [Security Studies] Summer pg. 63)

Minor proliferators are likely to enjoy two main sorts of command and control advantages that, by and large, the superpowers did not have. One, minor proliferators will enjoy greater organizational simplicity that stems from the *small size* and *simple composition* of their nuclear arsenals. This will help alleviate fears concerning rigid standard operating procedures, launch delegation, and the lack of use-control technologies. Two, they will be able to protect their arsenals from counterforce strikes using the most rudimentary weapons survival strategy: *concealment*. Reliance on concealment strategies will eliminate the need for launch-on-warning procedures and the dangerous time pressures they generate. The two advantages will work together to help alleviate dangers of minor proliferators losing possession of their nuclear weapons.>

**ADV 2**

**No asian wars.**

Richard A. **Bitzinger**, Senior Fellow-S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Barry Desker, Director-Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Nanyang Technological University, ‘8/**’9** (Survival 50.6, p. 105-128)

Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that **war in Asia** – while not inconceivable – **is unlikely**.

**No impact -- competitiveness theory is flawed.**

**Krugman 11** – joined The New York Times in 1999 as a columnist on the Op-Ed Page, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, became the Ford International Professor of Economics at MIT, one of the founders of the "new trade theory," American Economic Association awarded him the John Bates Clark medal (Paul, “Paul Krugman: Competitiveness deficit not cause of economic collapse,” January 24, 2011, <http://www.daytondailynews.com/opinion/columnists/paul-krugman-competitiveness-deficit-not-cause-of-economic-collapse-1062908.html>) // CB

Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Barack Obama has telegraphed his main theme: competitiveness. The president’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that “We can out-compete any other nation on Earth.” This may be smart politics. Arguably, Obama has enlisted an old cliche on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing. But let’s not kid ourselves: Talking about “competitiveness” as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, it’s a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to policies based on the false idea that what’s good for corporations is good for America. About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness? It’s true that we’d have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we can’t all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus — but if confronting China is what Obama is proposing, he should say that plainly. Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller still. But ultimately, we’re in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals. But isn’t it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No. Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by slashing his work force is considered successful. Well, that’s more or less what has happened in America recently: Employment is way down, but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success? Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Obama quiet claims that he’s anti-business. That’s fine, as long as he realizes that the interests of nominally “American” corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before. Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have nothing against either GE or Immelt. But with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming from U.S. operations, GE’s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity. By the way: Some have praised Immelt’s appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days GE derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing — indeed, GE Capital, which received a government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout. So what does the administration’s embrace of the rhetoric of competitiveness mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as I said, is that it’s simply packaging for an economic strategy that’s centered on public investment, investment that’s actually about creating jobs now while promoting the nation’s longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Obama and his advisers really believe that the economy is ailing because they’ve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board deregulation. My guess is that we’re mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on infrastructure and education, I’ll be pleased. But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Obama feels the need to wrap these policies in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse. The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself.

**No short-term impact scenario – the US outpaces everyone economically.**

The **Arizona Republic** (Phoenix), August 29, **2004**, p. Lexis

With the Olympics winding down, it's a good time to turn to another type of international competition -- this one involving jobs, affluence and overall economic success. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a Paris-based group, tracks statistics for 30 of the world's more affluent nations, mainly in Europe, North America and Asia. As with its athletic success, the United States fares well on the economic playing field, too. Here are the medal winners in various categories: \* Per capita output. Gold: Luxembourg. Silver: United States. Bronze: Norway. This indicator of economic strength divides gross domestic product by population. With per capita output above $36,100 in 2002, the United States was well ahead of Japan and the big European nations. \* Disposable household income per capita. Gold: United States. Silver: Switzerland. Bronze: Norway. This gauge focuses on disposable income or spendable money per person. As with per capita output, it's notable the United States is battling for high honors with a handful of small, affluent nations. U.S. disposable income topped $25,900 in 2002. \* Savings rate. Gold: Norway. Silver: South Korea. Bronze: Poland. In this measure of financial responsibility, the United States America isn't anywhere near the winners' podium. Our savings rate of 2.5 percent in 2002 put us third from the bottom, ahead of only Portugal and the Slovak Republic. Americans might not feel the same urgency to save, given generally better prospects for finding jobs here. \* Low unemployment rate. Gold: South Korea. Silver: Luxembourg. Bronze: Netherlands. This self-explanatory category recognizes countries with low joblessness. The United States had below-average, 6 percent unemployment in 2003, but didn't quite make it to medals contention. The OECD adjusts jobless rates and certain other statistics to make them comparable. \* Low chronic joblessness. Gold: Mexico. Silver: South Korea. Bronze: Norway. This gauge tracks long-term unemployment -- people unable to find work within a year. The United States just missed a bronze, placing fourth. Americans usually don't stay idle for long, relatively speaking. Mexico's top rating might seem a surprise, but it's worth noting that many Mexicans work in the United States and comparatively few Mexican women are in the labor force -- two factors that improve Mexico's results. \* Productivity. Gold: Luxembourg. Silver: United States. Bronze: Norway. America's economy has been propelled by strong productivity, which reflects both diligent workers and heavy investment in labor-saving equipment. This measure tracks output divided by the number of employed people. In a related measure, output per hour worked, the United States wouldn't win a medal, but still fares well. The gold in that competition would go to Norway, followed by Luxembourg and Belgium. \* Low cost of living. Gold: Poland. Silver: Czech Republic. Bronze: Slovak Republic and Turkey (tie). This number from 2004 tells how much bang American consumers would get for their buck in various places. It reveals developing Eastern European nations as bargains, with Switzerland and Japan as the most expensive. A basket of goods selling for $100 in the United States would range from about $53 in Poland to $151 in Switzerland. Taken together, such contests show the United States to be a strong economic player. Particularly impressive is our competitiveness against other large nations. It sometimes can be easy to get down on the home team -- until you make comparisons against the rest of the field.

**US won’t be dragged into an Asian war**

Jeffrey **Record**, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, senior research fellow at the Center for Int’l Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, PhD from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Int’l Studies, Winter **2001**, Aerospace Power Journal, v15 i4, “Thinking about China and War,” p. InfoTrac OneFile

Chinese military action against Asian mainland states not allied with the United States probably would not occasion a direct, armed US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Vietnamese war scenarios of the kind that transpired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, would not directly engage the vital interests of the United States--unless they spilled over into attacks on US forces and allies. Why would the United States intervene in such conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest in peace and stability on the Asian mainland and a specific interest in deterring nuclear war between other states. But would it go to war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, say, Russia and China? It was certainly not prepared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani exchange during the South Asian nuclear-war scare of 1999.

**No impact—Even if the US declines, liberal international norms will survive**

**Ikenberry 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/>

articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

For all these reasons, **many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order.** The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. **According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China,** which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, **pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged.** According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. **But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well.** **The struggle** over international order today **is not about fundamental principles**. China and other **emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles** of the **liberal** international **order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.** Indeed, **today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order** -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. **Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system.** In the meantime, **alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize.** **Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system** -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- **the liberal international order has no competitors**. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. **To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive.** Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

**Heg fails – we cant assert our influence effectively**

**Maher** 11-12-**2010** (Richard is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University. “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World” Science Direct) BW

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes.¶ As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics.¶ As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

**3. Their authors have it backwards – countries will take advantage of U.S. security guarantees to provoke war**

**Eland, 02** (Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ivan, “The Empire Strikes Out The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws", Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)

Of course, one way to try to enhance American credibility would be to deploy increasingly large numbers of U.S. forces on foreign soil and ships in foreign ports. But such forward engagement is practical only when small, dispersed forces can efficiently dominate a vast geographical area. In addition, the trend has been in the opposite direction— the United States has reduced its overseas military presence and foreign bases— making the extended deterrence strategy ring hollow. The U.S. military (particularly the Navy), by choosing to purchase expensive armaments in ever smaller quantities, reduces the number of places the dwindling (but more powerful) U.S. forces can be at once. The extended deterrence strategy also will not be credible because the United States does not really put the same value on all parts of the world. As a result, a policy of extended deterrence could actually invite challenges from rival states wanting to expose the underlying unreality of the posture. In such a case, Washington would be forced to choose between a humiliating climb-down or a conflict over a strategically irrelevant piece of real estate. The strategy of empire could prove counterproductive in other ways as well. For starters, Washington’s self-assumed responsibility to keep order could be exploited by all sorts of states wanting to advance their own goals. Taiwan could declare its independence with the expectation that the United States would protect it from China’s reaction; Pakistan could exploit its new strategic importance by successfully challenging India on Kashmir; rebel groups everywhere could intentionally provoke crackdowns—like the Kosovo Liberation Army did in southern Serbia in 1999—with the presumption that the United States would step in and internationalize their cause; and Arab countries, knowing that the Bush administration needs their support for any invasion of Iraq, are withholding it, unless the United States can show progress in its efforts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**1nr**

**2. Probability outweighs magnitude – the logic of any risk of extinction outweighs destroys rational risk assessment**

**Kessler ‘8** [Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” *Alternatives*  33 (2008), 211-232]

**If** the **risk** of terrorism **is defined**in traditional terms **by**probability and **potential loss,** then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that **even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as**the measure of **loss goes to infinity**.^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": **If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged),** then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and **risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor breaks down**. Under the historical con- dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter- rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, **the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty**. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; **uncer- tainty is a** crucial **precondition for catastrophies.** In particular, cata- strophes happen at once, **without a warning**, but with major impli- cations for the world polity. In this category, **we find** the impact of **meteorites.** Mars attacks**, the tsunami in** South East **Asia, and 9/11.** To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap- pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro- phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur- rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob- lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that **we do not** even **know** who or what will constitute **the most serious future threat,** "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that **even** the most **absurd scenarios** can **gain plausibility. By construct- ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the** residual **impression is** one of **plausibility. "**54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. **The connection between Saddam** Hussein **and Al Qaeda** that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin- ning. False evidence **was** again and again **presented and refuted, but this did not prevent** the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war **the improbable yet possible connection** between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. **As** Donald Rumsfeld famously **said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."** This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer- tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

**Leads to self fulfilling prophecies.**

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(Queer Frontiers, ed. Boone, author’s italics)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, *changed* – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,”6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively *local* in shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings *somewhere else*, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and the prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’”7 The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the *figure* of apocalypse – agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “*on the behalf of the existence of everyone*.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival serves to authorize *any* expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.”8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

**Linear single-issue approaches to addressing climate fail – they pave over multiple, intersecting complex systems**

**Levy and Lichtenstein, 2011** – Levy is a Professor in Management and Marketing at UMass while Lichtenstein is an associate professor in management at UMass (David and Benyamin, “Approaching Business and the Environment with Complexity Theory”, Oxford Press, <http://www.faculty.umb.edu/david_levy/LevyLicht2011_complexity_chap32.pdf>) //BZ

Intervention in sociotechnical systems entails coordinated action by large numbers of actors, raising the problem of collective action. Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” describes the tendency toward inaction in the face of the overuse of a common resource, such as the atmosphere, when private actors can free-ride and have little incentive to change their behavior. Various societal institutions have evolved to address such collective action problems (Ostrom 1990), but **large-scale systemic crises require** costly measures that demand **a**n often **lengthy process to build consensus**. In part, **such delays and disagreements reflect differences in technical understandings of complex systems. Action on climate change**, for example**, has been delayed while** various **parties argue over the best course of action: cap-and-trade versus carbon taxes, nuclear** power **versus renewable energy.** Yet **these differences are also deeply political, reflecting the asymmetric ways** in which **actors perceive** that a **crisis and remedial action will affect them**. The fiercest proponents of action on climate change are the low-lying countries likely to be swamped by rising sea levels. In contrast, the countries and sectors who strongly oppose action tend to be heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Some rich countries might be willing to pay 1-2 per cent of GDP to cut emissions, but developing countries demand massive transfusions of capital if they are to transition from cheap fossil fuels. The failure to reach agreement in Copenhagen was largely due to these deep divisions. **Problems** of collective action **are exacerbated by the need to coordinate multiple forms of intervention** in complex dynamic systems. **Neither** a carbon **tax nor a single tech**nological breakthrough **will,** by itself, **solve the climate problem**, a point made by Jones (2009) in his system dynamics model of the evolution of the solar industry. **Intervention in complex systems is also hindered by the likelihood of undesired and unanticipated consequences**. Raising vehicle fuel economy standards reduces the cost of travel per mile, encouraging more car travel. Incentives to raise production of biofuels could raise food prices, and perhaps encourage clearcutting forests. These uncertainties have led some to suggest that **complex systems are essentially unmanageable.** Perrow’s (1989) study of the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island concluded that catastrophic accidents were “normal” in the context of highly complex socio-technical systems. Even the most carefully designed systems, Perrow argued, could not always prevent occasional human or technological failures from cascading into major disasters. **The explosion and massive oil leak from BP**’s oil well in spring 2010 **highlights the challenge of anticipating every potential eventuality**, especially when regulators and managers are under pressure to overlook risks to meet deadlines and profit targets.

* **And, focus on underlying structures producing violence outweighs a one shot linear cause for conflict**

**Hendrick 9** (Diane, University of Bradford, Dept of Peace Studies, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications”, Centre for Conflict Resolution, June)

John Paul Lederach, drawing on Wheatley, has found the notion of ―process-structures to be of value in understanding this notion of change and stability. Wheatley uses other terms than Maturana and Varela : "things that maintain form over time yet have no rigidity of structure." (Wheatley, 2006 p. 16) (emphasis added). Lederach is concerned to show a combination of linearity and circularity in the dynamics of conflicts. His representation of complexity concepts is filtered but has, therefore, the advantage that it is not a direct translation of terms from one realm to another with the inherent dangers mentioned above. He stresses connection but it is important for him to understand this in social systems as ―relationship‖. In the circular change process he describes there are non-linear relationships in terms of unpredictability and disproportionality (no linear progress in this sense) at the same time, however, the system is moving in a certain direction (time irreversibility). He understands system properties as the context of relationships out of which conflict episodes emerge. He recognises the importance of discovering the underlying patterns in the system that are producing the conflicts. As Lederach notes a systemic approach requires a reorientation from a focus on events and specific outcomes to the recognition of patterns that emerge over time, and here he echoes the advice of Peter Senge when he refers to the human tendency to a ―fixation on events: ―We are conditioned to see life as a series of events, and for every event, we think there is one obvious cause...such explanations may be true as far as they go**, but they distract** us from seeing the longer-term patterns of change that lie behind the events and from understanding the causes of those patterns". (Senge, 1990; 2006 p. 2)

**2. Newest studies prove that CO2 is not anthropogenic – emissions from fossil fuels only stay in the atmosphere for five years and natural forcings are more important**

**Marohasy, 09** (Jennifer, senior fellow at the Australian think tank the Institute of Public Affairs, PhD in biology from the University of Queensland. Cites research from Robert H. Essenhigh, Department of Mechanical Engineering at Ohio State University, “Carbon Dioxide in Atmosphere 5-15 Years Only” 4-17-09. <http://jennifermarohasy.com/blog/2009/04/carbon-dioxide-in-atmosphere-5-15-years-only/>)

If carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels only stayed in the atmosphere a few years, say five years, then there may not be quite the urgency currently associated with anthropogenic global warming. Indeed it might be argued that the problem of elevated levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide could be easily reversed as soon as alternative fuel sources where found and/or just before a tipping point was reached. The general consensus, however, is not five years, but rather more in the range of 50 to 200 years. But in a new technical paper to be published in the journal ‘Energy and Fuels’, Robert Essenhigh from Ohio State University, throws doubt on this consensus. Using the combustion/chemical-engineering Perfectly Stirred Reactor (PSR) mixing structure, or 0-D Box, as the basis of a model for residence time in the atmosphere, he explains that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels are likely to have a residence time of between 5 and 15 years. He further concludes that the current trend of rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is not from anthropogenic sources, but due to natural factors. Here’s the abstract: The driver for this study is the wide-ranging published values of the CO2 atmospheric residence time (RT), , with the values differing by more than an order of magnitude, where the significance of the difference relates to decisions on whether: (1) to attempt control of combustion-sourced (anthropogenic) CO2 emissions, if >100 years; or (2) not to attempt control, if ~10 years. This given difference is particularly evident in the IPCC First (1990) Climate Change Report where, in the opening Policymakers Summary of the Report, the RT is stated to be in the range 50 to 200 years; and, (largely) based on that, it was also concluded in the Report and from subsequent related studies that the current rising level of CO2 was due to combustion of fossil fuels, thus carrying the, now widely-accepted, rider that CO2 emissions from combustion should therefore be curbed. ¶ However, the actual data in the text of the IPCC Report separately states a value of 4 years. The differential of these two times is then clearly identified in the relevant supporting-documents of the report as being, separately: (1) a long-term (~100 years) adjustment or response time to accommodate imbalance increases in CO2 emissions from all sources; and, (2) the actual RT in the atmosphere, of ~4 years. ¶ As check on that differentiation, and its alternative outcome, the definition and determination of RT thus defined the need for and focus of this study. In this study, using the combustion/chemical-engineering Perfectly Stirred Reactor (PSR) mixing structure, or 0-D Box, for the model-basis, as alternative to the more-commonly used Global Circulation Models (GCM’s), to define and determine the RT in the atmosphere, then, using data from the IPCC and other sources for model validation and numerical determination, the data: (1) support the validity of the PSR model-application in this context; and (2) from the analysis, provide (quasi-equilibrium) residence times for CO2 of: ~5 years carrying C12; and of ~16 years carrying C14, with both values essentially in agreement with the IPCC short-term (4-year) value, separately, in agreement with most other data sources and notably a (1998) listing by Segalstad of 36 other published values, also in the range 5 to 15 years. Additionally, the analytical results then also support the IPCC analysis and data on the longer “adjustment time” (~100 years) governing the long-term rising “quasi-equilibrium” concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. For principal verification of the adopted PSR model, the data source used was outcome of the injection of excess 14CO2 into the atmosphere during the A-bomb tests in the 1950’s/60’s which generated an initial increase of approximately 1000% above the normal value, and which then declined substantially exponentially with time, with = 16 years, in accordance with the (unsteady-state) prediction from, and jointly providing validation for, the PSR analysis. With the short (5-15 year) RT results shown to be in quasi-equilibrium, this then supports the (independently-based) conclusion that the long-term (~100-year) rising atmospheric CO2 concentration is not from anthropogenic sources but, in accordance with conclusions from other studies, is most probably the outcome of the rising atmospheric temperature which is due to other natural factors. This further supports the conclusion that global warming is not anthropogenically driven as outcome of combustion. The economic and political significance of that conclusion will be self-evident.

**3. Growing emissions in developing countries make CO2 reduction impossible – modeling is irrelevant**

**Koetzle, 08** – Ph.D. and Senior Vice President of Public Policy at the Institute for Energy Research (William, “IER Rebuttal to Boucher White Paper”, 4/13/2008, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/>)

For example, if the United States were to unilaterally reduced emissions by 30% or 40% below 2004 levels[8] by 2030; net global CO2 emissions would still increase by more than 40%. The reason is straightforward: either of these reduction levels is offset by the increases in CO2 emissions in developing countries. For example, a 30% cut below 2004 levels by 2030 by the United States offsets less than 60% of China’s increase in emissions during the same period. In fact, even if the United States were to eliminate all CO2 emissions by 2030, without any corresponding actions by other countries, world-wide emissions would still increase by 30%. If the United States were joined by the other OECD countries in a CO2 reduction effort, net emissions would **still significantly increase**. In the event of an OCED-wide reduction of 30%, global emissions increase by 33%; a reduction of 40% still leads to a net increase of just under 30%. Simply put, in order to hold CO2 emissions at 2004 levels, absent any reductions by developing nations like China and India, all OECD emissions would have to cease.[9] The lack of participation by all significant sources of GHGs not only means it is unlikely that net reductions will occur; it also means that the cost of meaningful reductions is increased dramatically. Nordhous (2007) for example, argues that for the “importance of near-universal participation to reduce greenhouse gases.”[10] His analysis shows that GHG emission reduction plans that include, for example, 50% of world-wide emissions impose additional costs of 250 percent. Thus, he find’s GHG abatement plans like Kyoto (which does not include significant emitters like the United States, China, and India) to be “seriously flawed” and “likely to be ineffective.” [11] Even if the United States had participated, he argues that Kyoto would make “but a small contribution to slowing global warming, and it would continue to be highly inefficient.”[12]The data on emissions and economic analysis of reduction programs make it clear that GHG emissions are a global issue. Actions by localities, sectors, states, regions or even nations are unlikely to effectively reduce net global emissions unless these reductions are to a large extent mirrored by all significant emitting nations.

**4. Observational data proves warming has stopped – the multi-decadal oscillation overwhelms CO2 forcing**

**Akasofu, 08** – Former director of the Geophysical Institute and the International Arctic Research Center @ U of Alaska-Fairbanks (Syun-Ichi, “Global warming has paused”, 9/27/2008, <http://newsminer.com/news/2008/sep/27/global-warming-has-paused/?opinion>)

Recent studies by the Hadley Climate Research Center (UK), the Japan Meteorological Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the University of East Anglia (UK) and the University of Alabama Huntsville show clearly that the rising trend of global average temperature stopped in 2000-2001. Further, NASA data shows that warming in the southern hemisphere has stopped, and that ocean temperatures also have stopped rising. The global average temperature had been rising until about 2000-2001. The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and many scientists hypothesize rising temperatures were mostly caused by the greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide (CO2), and they predicted further temperature increases after 2000. It was natural to assume that CO2 was responsible for the rise, because CO2 molecules in the atmosphere tend to reflect back the infrared radiation to the ground, preventing cooling (the greenhouse effect) and also because CO2 concentrations have been rapidly increasing since 1946. But, this hypothesis on the cause of global warming is just one of several. Unfortunately, many scientists appear to forget that weather and climate also are controlled by nature, as we witness weather changes every day and climate changes in longer terms. During the last several years, I have suggested that it is important to identify the natural effects and subtract them from the temperature changes. Only then can we be sure of the man-made contributions. This suggestion brought me the dubious honor of being designated “Alaska’s most famous climate change skeptic.” The stopping of the rise in global average temperature after 2000-2001 indicates that the hypothesis and prediction made by the IPCC need serious revision. I have been suggesting during the last several years that there are at least two natural components that cause long-term climate changes. The first is the recovery (namely, warming) from the Little Ice Age, which occured approximately 1800-1850. The other is what we call the multi-decadal oscillation. In the recent past, this component had a positive gradient (warming) from 1910 to 1940, a negative gradient (cooling — many Fairbanksans remember the very cold winters in the 1960s) from 1940 to 1975, and then again a positive gradient (warming — many Fairbanksans have enjoyed the comfortable winters of the last few decades or so) from 1975 to about 2000. The multi-decadal oscillation peaked around 2000, and a negative trend began at that time. The second component has a large amplitude and can overwhelm the first, and I believe that this is the reason for the stopping of the temperature rise. Since CO2 has only a positive effect, the new trend indicates that natural changes are greater than the CO2 effect, as I have stated during the last several years.

**Iran proves it takes decades to develop an arsenal; new weapons don’t appear out of thin air**

Fox, 07 (Stuart, author for Scienceline, “Why is it taking Iran so long to make a nuclear weapons? Didn’t it only take the US four years to invent them?”) < <http://scienceline.org/2007/11/20/ask-fox-nuclearbombs/>>

Iran and its nuclear program appears a great deal in the news these days, even with estimates that they are five to ten years away from completing a nuclear weapon. To understand why it’s taken Iran over 18 years to build a bomb, one needs to consider the steps it takes to build a bomb, and differences between the conditions in which Iran and the U.S. pursued this technology.

**And, expenses – the sheer number of workers and materials means that developing weapons won’t be quick.**

Fox, 07 (Stuart, author for Scienceline, “Why is it taking Iran so long to make a nuclear weapons? Didn’t it only take the US four years to invent them?”) < <http://scienceline.org/2007/11/20/ask-fox-nuclearbombs/>>

According to “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” by Richard Rhodes, to build the uranium bomb that would eventually be dropped on Hiroshima, America needed to enrich 137 pounds of uranium. To separate that much U235 — as well as put together an atomic bomb — (5) the U.S. government developed a nuclear program during World War II, dubbed the Manhattan Project. Under the direction of this project, the largest building in the world at the time was constructed to house the uranium enrichment equipment. It was assembled by 20,000 construction workers, took 12,000 people to operate, and cost $6.1 billion, adjusted from 1941 into 2007 dollars. By the close of World War II, the Manhattan Project employed more Americans than the automobile industry. Once it was built, workers laboring for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, took three years to produce enough properly enriched uranium for the bomb

**US won’t be dragged into an Asian war**

Jeffrey **Record**, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, senior research fellow at the Center for Int’l Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, PhD from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Int’l Studies, Winter **2001**, Aerospace Power Journal, v15 i4, “Thinking about China and War,” p. InfoTrac OneFile

Chinese military action against Asian mainland states not allied with the United States probably would not occasion a direct, armed US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Vietnamese war scenarios of the kind that transpired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, would not directly engage the vital interests of the United States--unless they spilled over into attacks on US forces and allies. Why would the United States intervene in such conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest in peace and stability on the Asian mainland and a specific interest in deterring nuclear war between other states. But would it go to war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, say, Russia and China? It was certainly not prepared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani exchange during the South Asian nuclear-war scare of 1999.

**3. Their authors have it backwards – countries will take advantage of U.S. security guarantees to provoke war**

**Eland, 02** (Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ivan, “The Empire Strikes Out The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws", Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)

Of course, one way to try to enhance American credibility would be to deploy increasingly large numbers of U.S. forces on foreign soil and ships in foreign ports. But such forward engagement is practical only when small, dispersed forces can efficiently dominate a vast geographical area. In addition, the trend has been in the opposite direction— the United States has reduced its overseas military presence and foreign bases— making the extended deterrence strategy ring hollow. The U.S. military (particularly the Navy), by choosing to purchase expensive armaments in ever smaller quantities, reduces the number of places the dwindling (but more powerful) U.S. forces can be at once. The extended deterrence strategy also will not be credible because the United States does not really put the same value on all parts of the world. As a result, a policy of extended deterrence could actually invite challenges from rival states wanting to expose the underlying unreality of the posture. In such a case, Washington would be forced to choose between a humiliating climb-down or a conflict over a strategically irrelevant piece of real estate. The strategy of empire could prove counterproductive in other ways as well. For starters, Washington’s self-assumed responsibility to keep order could be exploited by all sorts of states wanting to advance their own goals. Taiwan could declare its independence with the expectation that the United States would protect it from China’s reaction; Pakistan could exploit its new strategic importance by successfully challenging India on Kashmir; rebel groups everywhere could intentionally provoke crackdowns—like the Kosovo Liberation Army did in southern Serbia in 1999—with the presumption that the United States would step in and internationalize their cause; and Arab countries, knowing that the Bush administration needs their support for any invasion of Iraq, are withholding it, unless the United States can show progress in its efforts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**4. Multipolarity solves – U.S. withdrawal makes other powers work together to stabilize hotspots**

**Layne et. al, 02** (Christopher & Ben Schwarz, “A New Grand Strategy”, Atlantic Monthly, Jan 2002, vol. 289, no. 1, p. asp// wyo-tjc)

With respect to Europe, the United States would endorse the EU's efforts—which Washington now opposes—to acquire the military capabilities it needs to defend its interests independent of the United States. At the same time, the United States would begin a phased withdrawal from its European security commitments. To be sure, many U.S. policymakers have argued that the Europeans have demonstrated their incapacity (during the Balkan crises, for instance) to act effectively without U.S. “leadership:' But these protests are hypocritical—who can blame the Europeans for their inability to assert themselves in security affairs when Washington has for decades repeatedly squelched European initiatives that would have made that assertion possible? An offshore balancing strategy would hold that America's strategic interest in Europe does not demand that Washington insure against every untoward event there. Disorder in the Balkans and other places on Europe's fringes should be a matter for Europeans, who have the wherewithal to combat it, quarantine it, or, if they choose, ignore it. The United States would follow a similar policy with respect to Japan. Washington would announce to Tokyo its intention to terminate the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty within a specified time period (say, five years), at the end of which Japan, for more than fifty years a politically stable state, would have developed whatever military means it believes necessary to function as an independent great power. An offshore balancing strategy would turn on a simple truth: other states have at least as much interest as the United States does in secure sea-lanes, access to resources, and regional stability. The less America does, and the less others expect it to do, the more other states will do to help themselves. Recognizing the legitimacy of other great powers' spheres of influence offers the United States a further strategic advantage. The Persian Gulf and Central Asia show why. Russia and China both are profoundly concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on their peripheries. In Chechnya, in Central Asia (where Russian troops help to defend the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and in the Caucasus, Moscow has fought major military campaigns to protect its southern flank against militant Islam. China, too, is combating terrorism fomented by Islamic separatists, in the Xinjiang province. Last June, Beijing and Moscow entered into a security relationship, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which also embraces three of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia), to coordinate efforts to combat the common threat to their security posed by these Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups—groups linked to the Taliban and Osaina bin Laden. Similarly, India, a possible future great power, has been battling Islamic terrorists who are waging a proxy war on Pakistan's behalf to wrest the disputed province of Kashmir away from New Delhi. Simply put, for reasons of security and access to oil, Russia, China, India, Western Europe, and Japan have strong reasons-stronger than America's—to pacify Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. By adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States will compel them to do so. Passing the buck would help the United States out of the impasse that securing Afghanistan promises to be. The political and military challenges the war poses underscore how difficult and costly will be the effort to restore order in the country and the region when the fighting stops. When the United States has achieved its military goals in Afghanistan, it should announce a phased withdrawal from its security commitments in the region, shifting to others the hard job of stabilizing it.